This paper examines the dependence of network performance measures on network size and considers scaling results for large networks. We connect two performance measures that are well studied, but appear to be unrelated. The first measure is concerned with energy metrics, namely, the H 2 -norm of a network, which arises in control theory applications. The second measure is concerned with the notion of "tail risk," which arises in economic and financial networks. We study the question of why such performance measures may deteriorate at a faster rate than the growth rate of the network. We first focus on the energy metric and its well-known connection to controllability Gramian of the underlying dynamical system. We show that undirected networks exhibit the most graceful energy growth rates as network size grows. This rate is quantified completely by the proximity of the spectral radius to unity or distance to instability. In contrast, we show that the simple characterization of energy in terms of network spectrum does not exist for directed networks. We demonstrate that for any fixed distance to instability, energy of a directed network can grow at an exponentially faster rate. We provide general methods for manipulating networks to reduce energy. In particular, we prove that certain operations that increase the symmetry in a network cannot increase energy (in an order sense). Additionally, we demonstrate that such operations can effectively reduce energy for many network topologies. Second, we focus on tail risk in economic and financial networks. In contrast to the H 2 -norm, which arises from computing the expectation of energy in the network, tail risk focuses on tail probability behavior of network variables. Although the two measures differ substantially, we show that they are precisely connected through the system Gramian. This surprising result explains why topology considerations rather than specific performance measures dictate the large-scale behavior of networks. Finally, we demonstrate the consistency of our theory with simulations on synthetic and real-life networks.
characterized by the nature of interconnections, or topology, and dimension, which is typically very large. Due to the preponderance of such networks, there is extensive literature on suitable performance measures and their behavior on different topologies. However, the idea of a "suitable" performance measure, as we discuss below, varies across applications. A major objective of this paper is to understand the underlying relationship between existing performance measures for large networks.
There is a substantial body of interdisciplinary research to find appropriate performance measures for large interconnected networks with stable dynamics and understand the underlying causes of dimension dependent scaling of these measures (see [2] and [4] [5] [6] [7] , for example). A commonly used performance measure for design of optimal controllers is the H 2 -norm. Specifically, Lin et al. [8] study the design of structured controllers for vehicular platoons with minimum H 2 -norm. It is observed there that optimal structured controllers with asymmetric feedback exhibit lower scaling (of H 2 -norm) with the number of vehicles than its symmetric counterpart and performs better in that sense. On the other hand, Young et al. [5] and Huang et al. [6] study the dependence of H 2 -norm on structural properties of the network, such as edge weights and underlying graph spectrum. Huang et al. study H 2 -norm-based volatility measures in undirected (symmetric) and stable network, where the volatility measure can be represented completely by the network spectrum. The scaling of H 2 -norm for different network topologies, such as ring, star, and cycle along with the effect of nodal degree perturbation and the consequent problem of critical edge identification are also studied there. Another important performance measure for vehicular platoon networks is the H ∞ -norm. The notion of harmonic instability, i.e., exponential scaling of H ∞norm in vehicular platoons is studied in [2] . Herman et al. study network topologies where a shock on the leader vehicle of a stable platoon network is magnified exponentially in its size. Due to this exponential scaling, control of such a network becomes increasingly problematic as its dimension grows. Briefly, H 2 , H ∞norms or volatility measures are different manifestations of energy of a network, which is described in the future sections.
A seemingly different performance measure than the system norms discussed before is studied in [4] and [1] . Acemoglu et al. introduce a measure called tail risk to assess performance in economic production networks. Tail risk measures the probability of output falling below a certain threshold in response to an input shock. A key feature of tail risk is that it can manifest only in networks with large dimension, and hence captures the idea of performance degradation when network size increases perfectly. A major conclusion of their work is that some amount of balancedness is needed in a large network to exhibit no tail risk.
In control systems theory robust stability, with no structural constraints on the feedback, is well understood (see [9] for details). Robust stability entails the study of controllers that provide internal stability to all networks (or plants) in a given set. This is particularly useful in the case when there is some uncertainty about the network, such as unknown edge weights, etc. The notion of "network robustness" that we discuss here is different from traditional robust stability. We focus on large networks with stable dynamics, where we study the behavior of performance measures, such as the H 2 -norm or tail risk. Specifically, we are interested in the scaling of these measures as a function of network dimension. We study the underlying causes of this scaling and find conditions under which it can be attributed to the proximity of network spectrum to unity. This introduces the idea of asymptotic instability which is characterized by the spectral radius approaching unity as network size increases, for a given topology. We will study the dependence of performance scaling on asymptotic instability and show when it does not completely explain such scaling. We will observe that excessive scaling in performance measures are closely related to notions of criticality, centrality, and robustness in graphs, that are well studied in algebraic graph theory. However, there the graphs considered are "static" (no associated dynamics) or at equilibrium conditions. Real-life networks, on the other hand, are characterized by their associated topology along with their complex interconnections and system dynamics. Therefore, a simultaneous consideration of control and graph theoretic tools is necessary for the design of robust networks, where performance measure scales gracefully with network size.
Although there is a myriad of techniques to assess performance in large networks, it is not clear if there exists some connection between them. For example, it is shown by Acemoglu et al. that balanced networks exhibit no tail risk; on the other hand, Lin et al. show that symmetric networks (a subclass of balanced networks) do not perform optimally. The dichotomy of these results is surprising, since the underlying dynamics are similar. A major contribution of this work is that, we provide a general framework to analyze these seemingly disparate results. We also find optimal (in an appropriate sense) topologies, where performance does not degrade rapidly as network size increases.
The presentation of the paper is as follows, we introduce some mathematical notation in Section II. In Section III, we present the mathematical preliminaries required to understand the paper. We formalize the notion of large networks used in this paper and describe the network topologies that will be discussed throughout the paper. We also define network robustness in large networks here and show its relation to network energy. Following this, in Section IV, we characterize robustness for undirected (symmetric) networks and prove that such a characterization does not extend to directed networks. Through these observations, we show that undirected topologies exhibit the best performance for a fixed spectral radius. We establish connections between network robustness and different performance measures used in economics, transportation, and finance in Section V. The main results of the paper can be found in Sections IV and V. Finally, we conclude in Section VI. All proofs are in the appendix.
II. MATHEMATICAL NOTATION

Matrix Theory:
where v i denotes the ith element, unless specified otherwise. The vector 1 is the all 1s vector of appropriate dimension; to specify the dimension, we sometimes refer to it as 1 n , where it is a n × 1 vector. Similarly, for a m × n matrix, A, we refer to it as A m ×n when we want to specify dimension. We denote A that is a n × n matrix as A n for short hand. For a matrix, A, we denote by ρ(A) its spectral radius. Additionally, we have
. We have a similar notation for the singular values of A denoted by σ i (A). I is the identity matrix of appropriate dimension.
The L p norm of a matrix A is given by
||A|| S is the Schatten norm, i.e., ||A|| S = n i=1 σ i (A). For positive semidefinite (psd) matrices the Schatten norm equals the trace of the matrix. The symbol denotes the Loewner order between two Hermitian matrices A,
Order Notation: For functions f (·), g(·), we have f (n) = O(g(n)), when there exist constants C, n 0 such that f (n) ≤ Cg(n) for all n ∈ N > n 0 . Further, if f (n) = O(g(n)), then g(n) = Ω(f (n)). For functions g(·), h(·), we have g(n) = Θ(h(n)), when there exist constants C 1 , C 2 , n 1 such that C 1 h(n) ≤ g(n) ≤ C 2 h(n) for all n ∈ N > n 1 . Finally, for functions h 1 (·), h 2 (·), we have h 1 (n) = o(h 2 (n)), when lim n →∞ |h 1 (n)/h 2 (n)| = 0.
Graph Theory: A graph is the tuple
. . , v n } represents the set of nodes and E G ⊆ V G × V G represents the set of edges or communication links. An edge or link from node i to node j is denoted by
Probability Theory: For a random variable X, we define
is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of Gaussian distribution and is given by
We sometimes refer to the probability density function and cumulative distribution function of a random variable as pdf and cdf, respectively. For a random variable X, the τ -tail probability is given by
Miscellaneous: Denote by P d is the family of polynomials with degree ≤ d ∈ N.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we will focus on networks with linear dynamics given by (1) described as follows (See Fig. 1 ).
Here, x(k) = [x 1 (k), . . . , x n (k)] T is the vector of state variables. A is the n × n state transition matrix. δ(0, k) is the Kronecker delta function, with δ(0, 0) = 1 and δ(0, k) = 0 ∀ k = 0 and ω = [ω 1 , . . . , ω n ] T is exogenous to the system. We further assume that x(0) = 0. Additionally, we have the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: The dynamical behavior of the network is governed by (1) . Further, the state transition matrix A is Schur stable, i.e., ρ(A) < 1.
Assumption 1 is an assumption on the network dynamics and its stability that will be enforced on all networks in this paper, unless otherwise stated. We will call 1 − ρ(A) as the distance to instability of A.
Then, w(k) = ωδ(0, k) is a shock. Remark 1: Every network, in this paper, can be uniquely characterized by its state transition matrix, or network matrix, A.
The key feature in this paper is that we address large networks. We denote a large network by "a sequence of networks with network matrices {A n } ∞ n =1 , where the topology of each network in the sequence is fixed but network dimension grows successively." This treatment is along the lines of graph limits as discussed in [10] . For example, to denote a large star network, we define a sequence of star networks {A n } ∞ n =1 with dimensions n × n = 1 × 1, 2 × 2, 3 × 3, . . .. In this example, we have
From here on, whenever we use "sequence of networks" we will mean a "large" network. A mathematical quantity that will play an important role in the discussion of performance scaling is the (identity) Gramian that we define below (see [11] for a detailed exposition).
Definition 4: The (identity) Gramian of a Schur stable matrix A is given by P (A), or, P , where P = A T P A + I.
Throughout this paper, we consider some commonly encountered networks. We summarize them below.
Networks With Degree Normalization These networks are of the form A n = γD −1 n A n , where D n is the degree matrix, A n is the adjacency matrix of A n and 0 < γ < 1. Edges with arrow are directed edges. We will refer to the regular, star, cycle, directed line degree networks as R n , S n , C n , DL n , respectively.
Network With Loops
The topology in Fig. 3 appears frequently in transportation networks as vehicular platoons. The values of λ i , i are chosen to ensure Schur stability of the network
Random Networks
Our results can be extended to random discrete time LTI systems. We consider the Wigner ensemble defined as follows:
Definition 5: A Wigner matrix W n (σ) is a matrix that has the following properties: 2
The performance measures we are concerned with are closely related to the "network energy" that we describe below. Definition 6: The H 2 -norm of a network A is given by
H 2 -norm is a common system norm that will occur frequently in our discussion to measure performance of a network. In fact, H 2 -norm measures the cumulative amplification of a shock due to network effects, i.e., network energy. Here, we present an interpretation of network energy. At time k = 0, each node i is hit with a shock, ω i , then we are interested in the following questions:
then what is maximum effect of the shock on the network? 2) If ω is a random shock, then what is the effect of the shock on the network, on average? We measure the energy of the network by the quantity,
, and without loss of generality, we will assume x(0) = 0.
Definition 7: Given a network A with a deterministic input shock, ω, max norm M(A) is given by
We will refer to M(A) as the maximum disruption energy of A.
Definition 8: Given a network A with a random shock ω, average norm (per node) E(A) is defined as the following:
Here, E[ω] = 0, E[ωω T ] = I. We will refer to E(A) as the average disruption energy of A.
M(A) and E(A) represent two different aspects of network robustness. When there is a deterministic shock incident to the network, M(A) denotes the maximum energy that can propagate through the network. On the other hand, if it is a random shock, then E(A) denotes expected energy that propagates through the network (due to each node). However, M(A), E(A) are closely related through the Gramian P (A), which itself gives a complete energy profile for a network.
Whenever ρ(A) ≥ 1, it is well known that network energy increases in an unbounded fashion (see [11] ). To simply observe the effect of interconnections on network energy, by factoring out the distance to instability i.e., 1 − ρ(A), we propose the scaled H 2 -norm.
Using the H 2 -norm as a performance measure (or robustness measure), we formalize the notion of "graceful scaling." Definition 10: A large network A n is robust (in an asymptotic sense) if we have 1) Network matrix A n is stable for each n;
Here, p(·) ∈ P d for some d ∈ N. Fragility is the lack of robustness in the sense of superpolynomial or exponential scaling of trace(P (A n )) for {A n }. Further, let A 1 , A 2 be two networks and H 2 (A 1 n ) = Θ(p 1 (n)), H 2 (A 2 n ) = Θ(p 2 (n)). Then, 1) If p 1 (n) = o(p 2 (n)), then A 1 n performs better than A 2 n in H 2 -norm. 2) If p 1 (n) = Θ(p 2 (n)), then A 1 n performs as well as A 2 n . 3) If p 2 (n) = o(p 1 (n)), then A 1 n performs worse than A 2 n . Definition 11 (Spectral Balancing): Given a large network, A n , and any 0 < < 1, we define its -balanced version as
where ρ(A n ) = γ < 1, Γ n is a diagonal matrix with ρ(Γ n ) ≤ γ and spectral decomposition of P (A n ) given by P (A n ) = U n D n U T n . Remark 2: It is easy to observe that for an -balanced version, we have that max(a j i , a ij ) − min(a j i , a ij ) ≤ max(a j i , a ij ) − min(a j i , a ij ) for every pair i, j. Balancing makes a network more undirected.
Spectral balancing will be useful in understanding what network topologies perform better and will be discussed in the future sections.
IV. ROBUSTNESS IN LARGE NETWORKS
We analyze network energy of an undirected network and show that it is completely characterized by its spectral radius.
Proposition 2: For a large undirected network A n we have
Proposition 2 is an extension of Proposition 1 in [6] . According to this, the scaling in the "network volatility" or H 2 -norm of a large network is limited by the proximity of its spectral radius to unity. For completeness, we present the H 2 -norm of the networks introduced before.
Proposition 3: For the topologies in Fig. 2 .
The result for Wigner ensemble is true with probability 1. The proof of this proposition and numerical verification can be found in [12] . It turns out that the maximum disruption in S n is more than in R n . This happens because one unit of energy given to the central node is transferred to every other node at the next time instant (an amplification of n − 1). On the other hand in R n , only 1/(n − 1) energy is transferred to every other node. However, both have the similar disruption on average because the probability of picking the central node is 1/n (assume uniform) and as a result
Another surprising observation is the high network energy for DL n despite the spectral radius being zero. One possible explanation is the unidirectional nature of the network where energy is transferred from one node to the other as is. The natural question to ask is if there exists a characterization of network energy based on spectral radius for directed networks.
Proposition 4: For the large network VP n (in Fig. 2 ) with i = 1 and δ 1 < λ i < δ 2 for all i and some 0 < δ 1 , δ 2 < 1, we have that the H 2 (VP n ) is Ω(exp (cn)) and ρ(VP n ) ≤ δ 2 . Based on Proposition 4, we see that poor scaling of performance measures, in general networks, cannot be attributed to their spectra. In fact, under certain conditions they might turn out to be independent.
In the next section, we discuss the applications of ideas developed here. We present a well-studied model of a platoon network. We show that balancing cannot increase network energy-which gives us a direction to improve performance in networks. Second, we present the case of an economic network. Although the performance measure seems quite different to network energy they are closely related by the Gramian.
V. CONNECTIONS TO PERFORMANCE MEASURES
A. Robustness as Network Energy
We revisit the discussion of H 2 -norm scaling in different networks (directed and undirected) from the previous section. We observe that, whenever possible, making a network more undirected always results in better performance scaling.
Theorem 1: For any large network A n with ρ(A n ) = γ, we have that
Here, A n is -balanced version of A n for any fixed 0 < < 1.
The implications of Theorem 1 are multifold. It guarantees that spectral balancing does not increase energy in an order sense. The intuition behind balancing, i.e., making the network "more symmetric," follows from Proposition 2, where we show that symmetric networks have the best possible scaling of network energy in network dimension. Indeed there are examples where an asymmetric controller is the most optimal (see Lin et al. [8] ) and balancing does not strictly reduce energy. However, designing such a controller is very challenging. Instead, Theorem 1 suggests that searching over balancing operations provides an easier alternative that may reduce network energy. In fact in Fig. 5 , we show that in many cases spectral balancing strictly reduces network energy.
Scaling in Network Controllers
Here, we present more concrete examples from transportation networks to show how robustness scaling manifests in controllers for vehicular platoons. We consider the vehicular platoon network discussed in [8] . The closed-loop dynamical system (see [8, eqs. (SS) and (VP2)]) is of the form (discretized single integrator version)
where x i (k) is the relative position error for vehicle i. Here, K is of the form
Assume first that K is symmetric, i.e., Fig. 4 . Feedback structure for symmetric platoon.
Additionally, ρ(I − K) < 1 for stability. The structure of the feedback is given in Fig. 4. x i denotes the position of vehicle i. Now, the optimal symmetric controller design is given by
Proposition 5: For the optimal symmetric controller in (4), we have
Although the number of nodes in the network are n, we observe that even the optimal controller gives a Ω(n) per vehicle scaling in the robustness measure. Such performance degradation might be harmful when strict control is required. Next, we consider an asymmetric controller studied in [2] given by
The solving for the optimal controller K asm = arg minimize K ,0≤ i ≤1 trace(P )
where (I − (K ) T )P (I − K ) + I = P.
Observe when i = 1 for all i, we have K = K sym , i.e., the symmetric controller discussed before. On the other extreme is when i = 0 for all i for which K is a purely asymmetric controller. Then, for the optimal asymmetric controller problem, we have that Proposition 6: For the optimal asymmetric controller in (6), we have H 2 (I − K asm ) = O(n 3/2 ).
Propositions 5 and 6 show that the network energy of the optimal symmetric controller is higher than the asymmetric one. The underlying cause of this is distance to instability (1 − ρ(I − K θ )), where θ ∈ {asm, sym}. To that end, we look at the scaled H 2 -norm of the controller. For symmetric case, by using Proposition 2, we have that
On the other hand for K asm , we have Equation (7) suggests that I − K sym is asymptotically unstable, i.e.,
This also means that if we suppress the effect of distance to instability, then there is no growth in network energy (as its size increases). One can conclude that the key to making an undirected network more robust is by increasing the distance to instability. A similar argument does not extend to directed networks. Indeed as discussed before, even if distance to instability is large a network may exhibit arbitrary scaling. Then, to make such a network more robust we use Theorem 1. We show how balancing affects network energy in Fig. 5 . For this case, we generate networks A n , such that [A n ] ij ∼ N (0, 1) are i.i.d. We scale them so that every network has spectral radius γ < 1 (see [13] for details). Γ n , as in Definition 11, is generated in a random fashion such that ρ(Γ n ) ≤ γ. Then, as we vary , it is observed that H 2 -norm reduces as increases.
B. Robustness as a Tail Risk Measure
In many applications, it is important to understand how far network output deviates from its mean in response to a random shock. Such a "worst" case analysis is important in areas such as economics where one is interested in knowing how far the output of a factory, for example, may fall below optimum in response to an input shock. Although both tail risk and expected energy, E(·)-norm, depend on certain network topological properties, the exact relation between them is unclear. In this section, we make the connection that scaling in both expected energy and tail probability of output depend solely on the underlying network Gramian.
In (1) assume that the shock ω ∼ N (0, I), i.e., ω i ∼ N (0, 1) and {ω i } n i=1 are independent. Define the aggregate output x ∞ as
with x(0) = 0 (for simplicity). In general, x(0) is the predefined output, and the model here captures the deviation from this value in response to a shock. Then, it is easy to check that x ∞ is a linear combination of independent standard normal random variables and thus a Gaussian random variable (see [14] ). We are interested in studying the distribution of aggregate output,
The assumption that ω i ∼ N (0, 1) is merely illustrative. Our results hold for a general class of distributions that we define as follows.
Definition 12: A random variable X has exponential tails if 1)
We denote its distribution by X ∼ E(μ, σ) .
For the remainder of this section, we will impose the following distributional assumption on ω:
, has continuous, symmetric pdf with full support. Further,
Example of E(μ, σ) is the standard normal, where μ = 0, σ = 1.
We focus on "worst case" analysis of aggregate output and will be interested in its tail probability behavior. From this perspective, E(μ, σ) is a richer class compared to the family of Gaussian distributions. At the same time, these distributions exhibit favorable tail behavior (such as the Large Deviation Principle [15] , etc.) that make them amenable to such analysis. We impose additional assumptions on the class of networks, we consider in this section Assumption 3: Network matrix A n has the following properties: 1) [A n ] ij ≥ 0;
2) There exists v such that
where v max /v min = O(1) and λ P F is the Perron root. Examples of such networks include networks with degree normalization introduced in Section III. These fall under the more general class of networks, where A n = γW n (0 < γ < 1) and W n is row-stochastic. Note that this assumption is weaker than those required for irreducibility or aperiodicity. For example, the star network S n is neither aperiodic nor irreducible, however, v max = v min (as v = 1) in that case.
We can now define tail risk in a network as follows.
Then, A n exhibits no tail risk if there exists z > 0 such that lim n →∞ R n (z) > 0. R n (·) is a measure of how likely it is for the average aggregate output to fall below a certain threshold −z in response to a shock. In this context, a robust large network is resistant to random shocks, i.e., output is not affected too much.
Example 1: Consider the special case when A n = μI n ×n . A simple computation shows us that
Then by Cramer's theorem, we have that lim n →∞ R n (z) > 0.
Next, when A n = μ[1, 1, . . . , 1] T [1, 0, . . . , 0], i.e.,
and then it is easy to show that lim n →∞ R n (z) = 0.
This follows because
In the first case, the shock is averaged out across the nodes: and the network exhibits no risk. In the second case, output of each node x i is heavily dependent on the other: and network exhibits tail risk.
In large networks, a fast decay of "failure" or "shortfall" probability with network dimension is ideal. R n (·) captures this notion of risk in networks-the more dependent individual components become, more likely the failure. Another interpretation that follows from Definition 13 is that whenever we have
for some σ 0 = O(1), the network does not exhibit tail risk. We will show in Theorem 3 that the converse is true as well. For example, the tail of x ∞ / √ n obtained from the star network S n becomes wider as n increases and it will be shown in Proposition 7 that star networks exhibit tail risk (see Fig. 6 ). The reason behind this is that σ(x ∞ ) → ∞ as n → ∞ for S n . This notion of comparison to Gaussian tail probability was introduced by Acemoglu et al. (see [1] , [4] ) to measure disruption in economic production networks. To formalize this first, we define "tail risk relative to standard normal" for random variables as this will give us some understanding of the behavior we intend to capture. where
Definition 14 implies that whenever τ -tail probability (for very large τ ) of X substantially exceeds that of Gaussian random variable, X exhibits tail risk relative to standard normal. r X (τ ) can, in general, be hard to visualize. A thumb rule for any X ∼ E(0, 1) and large enough τ > 0 is to inspect the tails of the pdf of X. This follows from item 3 in Definition 12, finiteness of moment generating function (see Chernoff's bound [16, Th. 2.29, Ch. 2]), and the approximation, for every x > τ, that is shown below
Here, f X (z) is the pdf of X at z. Fig. 7 shows a pair of distributions in the family E(0, 1): Gaussian and logistic distribution.
The pdf of logistic distribution f L (x) is given by
Logistic distribution exhibits tail risk relative to standard normal distribution due to "fatter tails." Now, we extend the previous definition to the context of networks by setting τ = √ n. This captures size-dependent scaling and follows the definition of macroeconomic tail risk in [1] and [4] .
Definition 15 (Macroeconomic Tail Risk): The network A n exhibits tail risk relative to the standard normal (or macroe-
where
Tail risk differs from macroeconomic tail risk in the sense that macroeconomic tail risk (after normalization by its mean and variance) is measured relative to the standard normal distribution. Both notions of risk are applied extensively in economic networks and financial systems, and as a result, it becomes important to understand how they relate to each other. 
where λ P F is its Perron root. We showed that a lack of tail risk is equivalent to constant scaling in L 1 -norm of an appropriate system Gramian. In the following discussion, we show that tail risk coincides with macroeconomic tail risk and its application to a real network setting.
Tail Risk in Input Output Networks In this section, we discuss applications of our results to the 2007 US commodity market. The data for this have been taken from [1] . It consists of a network with 379 sectors, where commodity generated by each sector is either utilized by itself or fed as input to another sector. These interconnections generate a network matrix, A 379 . Some properties of this network are 1) [A 379 ] ij ≥ 0; 2) ρ(A 379 ) 0.51;
3) A 379 (almost) satisfies Assumption 3. Now, it can be shown that
Here, y t is output deficit at time t in response to an input shock ω t . Details of the economic model are given in Sections II and III up to (25) in [16] , Sections I and VII in [1] . This is summarized briefly in Section VI-A. Then, x ∞ = ∞ t=0 1 T y t is the aggregate deficit. The aggregate deficit is useful in estimating business cycles and computing gross domestic product, or GDP (see proof of Proposition 1 [1] ). We observe that the tails of aggregate output deficit are indeed fatter compared to the standard normal distribution. The question is how this observation can be related to Theorem 2. In the next theorem, we demonstrate that, under mild conditions, a network exhibits tail risk whenever x ∞ has fatter tails. Fig. 8 ) suggests that the U.S. Commodity market network exhibits tail risk and this observation is corroborated through [1, Fig. 1 ]. Finally, through Theorems 2 and 3, we show that different notions of risk can be represented as robustness measures, i.e., manifestation of tail risk in a network is equivalent to poor scaling of some Gramian norm. We conclude with some examples of network topologies and comment on their robustness (to tail risk).
Proposition 7: The regular network R n and cycle network C n exhibit no macroeconomic tail risk. On the other hand, star network S n exhibits macroeconomic tail risk.
It is perhaps no coincidence that the star network, which has a high degree centrality (see [17] ), demonstrates tail risk. A generalization of degree centrality is eigenvector centrality. Definition 16: An irreducible network matrix A n demonstrates no eigenvector centrality if π max /π min = Θ(1)
where π T A n = π T . Corollary 1: If an irreducible network matrix A n has no eigenvector centrality, then it exhibits no tail risk.
It is not hard to verify that S n has a central node and R n , C n exhibit no centrality. In addition to showing that tail risk is closely related to network energy, we also relaxed some of the assumption on network structure imposed by Acemoglu et al. in [1] . Our analysis can be extended to the case when we have increasing returns to scale, i.e., n j =1 a ij > 1 for example.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper developed a general framework to study performance degradation in large networks. It is shown that dimensiondependent scaling of network energy is closely related to such degradation. The results here provide an analytical characterization of network energy scaling for an undirected network in terms of its distance to instability. It is shown that, for a fixed distance to instability, H 2 -norm scales at most linearly in the size of network. On the contrary, results here suggest that for directed networks distance to instability and H 2 -norm scaling may be completely unrelated. The observation that undirected networks exhibit a certain optimality in energy scaling could be used as a design principle to obtain more graceful performance. Under this general framework, notions of centrality and tail risk that appear more commonly in areas, such as economics, finance, etc. are related to network energy. This is a step toward more interdisciplinary research in design of robust network controllers.
The work here is confined to networks with linear stable dynamics. Further extensions to marginally stable dynamics, such as those in consensus networks, will be discussed in a future work.
APPENDIX
Due to a shortage of space, all proofs have been moved to [12] .
A. Economic Model
Consider the economy consisting of n competitive sectors denoted by {1, 2, . . . , n}, each producing a distinct product. Each sector corresponds to a node in the network graph. Firms in each sector employ Cobb-Douglas production technologies with constant returns to scale. Formally, for each sector, i, we have log (x i,t+1 ) = log (Σ i,t ) + log (η i,t ) + μ n j =1 a ij log (y ij,t ) + (1 − μ) log (l i,t ).
(11)
At each time t, x i,t is the output of sector i, Σ i,t ≥ 0 (since output of the network is always nonnegative) is the total factor productivity, l i,t is labor input to sector i, y ij,t is amount of output of sector j used for the production of output of sector i, and η i,t > 0 is some normalization constant. A larger a ij means that sector j is more important in the production of output of sector i. Constant returns to scale implies n j =1 a ij = 1 for all i, where a ij ≥ 0. From now, A n = [a ij ] will be referred as the economy's input-output, or network, matrix, where the network is denoted by N (A n ; G) , and G is the graph induced by A n . In (11) , Σ i,t is a multiplicative production factor in the dynamics of the network, where under no shock, Σ i,t = 1. We are interested in the case when Σ i,0 < 1 and Σ i,t = 1 for all t > 0 and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. This corresponds to a negative shock of the form log (Σ i,0 ) in the notation of (1). We further assume that log (Σ i,0 ) ∼ E(−m 2 , 1). The mathematical formulation in (11) is completed by two resource constraints
Here, Z t is the total leisure, c i,t is the consumption of product i at node i at time t, c t = n i=1 c i,t and the sum of total input labor and leisure is a constant. Finally, we assume that economy maximizes the following preference function over consumption and leisure (see [17, Sec. 2 and 3] ):
where β i ≥ 0 but β 0 = 0, and n j =1 β j = 1; β i is i's share in the household's utility function. There are two forms of heterogeneity-primitive and network (see [1] ). Intuitively, primitive heterogeneity stems from the difference in preferences, i.e., β i , across different sectors, meanwhile network heterogeneity is due to interconnections of input-output matrix. Since in this paper, we are concerned with topological dependence only, we will impose the following additional assumption.
Assumption 4: The utility function has no sectoral preferences, i.e., β i = 1/n.
Under optimal consumption and labor, i.e., optimizing V 0 under the constraints (11) and (12), we have (20) of [16] x t+1 = μA nxt + η + t .
Here, i,t = log (Σ i,t ),x t = [log (x 1,t ), . . . , log (x n,t )] T , and η is some constant input to the network. Now, we assume that the economic network is hit with a shock, t = , at t = 0 ( t = 0 for all t ≥ 1). Under no shock, i.e., t = 0 for all t ≥ 0, we have in (14) that
x ns t+1 = μA nx ns t + η. This gives uŝ x t+1 −x ns t+1 = μA n (x t −x ns t ) + t .
The quantity of interest here is y t =x t −x ns t , i.e., the output deficit in presence of a shock. Then, we have similar to (10) y t+1 = μA n y t + t . Then, in the notation of (10) ω t = t and A 379 = μA n .
